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Multidisciplinary Approaches and Challenges in Integrating Emerging 
Medical Devices Security Research and Education  
Abstract 
Traditional embedded systems such as secure smart cards and nano-sensor networks have been 
utilized in various usage models. Nevertheless, emerging secure deeply-embedded systems, e.g., 
implantable and wearable medical devices, have comparably larger “attack surface”. 
Specifically, with respect to medical devices, a security breach can be life-threatening (for which 
adopting traditional solutions might not be practical due to tight constraints of these often-
battery-powered systems), and unlike traditional embedded systems, it is not only a matter of 
financial loss. Unfortunately, although emerging cryptographic engineering research mechanisms 
for such deeply-embedded systems have started solving this critical, vital problem, university 
education (at both graduate and undergraduate level) lags comparably. One of the pivotal reasons 
for such a lag is the multi-disciplinary nature of the emerging security bottlenecks. Based on the 
aforementioned motivation, in this work, at Rochester Institute of Technology, we present an 
effective research and education integration strategy to overcome this issue in one of the most 
critical deeply-embedded systems, i.e., medical devices. Moreover, we present the results of two 
years of implementation of the presented strategy at graduate-level through fault analysis attacks, 
a variant of side-channel attacks. We note that the authors also supervise an undergraduate 
student and the outcome of the presented work has been assessed for that student as well; 
however, the emphasis is on graduate-level integration. The results of the presented work show 
the success of the presented methodology while pinpointing the challenges encountered 
compared to traditional embedded system security research/teaching integration of medical 
devices security. We would like to emphasize that our integration approaches are general and 
scalable to other critical infrastructures as well.      
Introduction 
Security and privacy of embedded systems have been center of attention in research and teaching 
whose compromise has direct organizational, societal, and economical adverse effects. 
Embedded systems in critical infrastructures, smart homes, smart fabrics, and similar smart 
platforms need to be secure to transfer data in private manner. Medical devices, e.g., implantable 
and wearable medical devices (IWMDs) which are commonly used for diagnosing, monitoring, 
and treating various medical conditions, are among the most critical smart platforms. Similar to 
other emerging usage models, a general trend is toward increased functional complexity and 
connectivity, resulting in larger attack surface. The growing number of instances of security 
breaches in the last few years in such extremely sensitive usage models has created a compelling 
case for efforts towards securing such systems1,2,3,4,5,6, and refining new research and teaching 
trends7, 8. Deeply-embedded systems such as medical devices will dominate the future of 
traditional embedded systems and will likely get wide-spread adoption about 100 times more 
compared to traditional desktops. 
IWMDs are generally categorized into 16 groups by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA): anesthesiology; cardiovascular; clinical chemistry and clinical toxicology; dental; ear, 
nose, and throat; gastroenterology and urology; general and plastic surgery; general hospital and 
personal use; hematology and pathology; immunology and microbiology; neurology; obstetric 
and gynaecologic; opthalmic; orthopedic; physical medicine; and radiology9. Many of such 
devices are able to communicate through wireless means. These, unlike traditional embedded 
systems, have three distinct characteristics, differentiating them from the traditional ones. First, 
such IWMDs are embedded deeply into human bodies, e.g., cardiovascular defibrillators 
embedded into human bodies which perform therapeutic tasks or Glucose Monitor and Insulin 
Pump monitoring pairs which are used for diagnosis and therapy. A security breach here is life-
threatening and unlike traditional embedded systems such as smart cards in which financial loss 
is the result of the breach, here, catastrophic and vitally-adverse problems are inevitable. Second, 
they are already developed and in wide-spread use and any change to provide security would 
require tremendous efforts. Third, the area/delay/power consumption and, in general, the 
implementation and performance metrics of these devices cannot, in most of the cases, tolerate 
the burden of the cryptographic algorithms used for traditional embedded systems. Specifically, 
for both hardware through application-specific integrated circuits (ASICs) and field-
programmable gate arrays (FPGAs), and software through microcontrollers, the potential 
unacceptable degradation of performance and implementation metrics is a meaningful concern 
for medical devices security. For instance, if the security protection schemes for a pacemaker 
(typically battery-powered to perform medical tasks for years) lead to its battery depletion in 
months instead of years, the resulting secure device would be life-threatening and impractical.  
Contributions 
There have been previous efforts for integrating research and teaching in traditional systems; 
nonetheless, to the best of our knowledge, a practical solution and an effective assessment 
strategy have not been adopted for emerging usage models integration such as IWMDs. Our 
pedagogical hypothesis is that emerging security research (through cryptographic solutions) can 
be integrated in university education considering three teaching and learning approaches; (a). 
Developing a respective multi-disciplinary laboratory (engineering, mathematics, and 
biomedicine in particular) for both research and teaching, (b). Advancing education through 
inter- and intra-university research collaborations in the aforementioned fields, and (c). 
Assessing the outcome through detailed benchmarks. The authors of this work are from different 
and diverse backgrounds and have prior expertise in the topic proposed (both teaching and 
research) and have been with world-known security and cryptography groups. This project is 
addressing the respective tradeoffs between the IWMDs security levels and affording the 
overheads. To meet this objective, we have used such methodology for two years in educating 
graduate students and brought them very well up to speed which resulted in successful research 
(publications in top-tier electrical and computer engineering IEEE Transactions journals for the 
case study of fault analysis attacks).  
The assessment strategy for the proposed integration is two-fold. A pilot project is developed 
(through work of undergraduate and graduate students) for testing the pedagogy in three phases: 
(a) education, (b) research, and (c) integration. The education phase takes into account the multi-
disciplinary aspects of the project and in the research phase, publishing through the outcomes of 
the education phase is the priority. Security integration assessment is based on the resources in 
the already-developed laboratory. 
 
Programming languages, especially hardware description languages of cryptographic algorithms 
developed in the courses, are used as final projects. The evaluation of success of integration of 
research and teaching is performed by a group of research/teaching faculty members with diverse 
departments. The results will be placed on the world-wide web for advancing global education 
and with the aim of possible improvement from both research and education communities. The 
eventual outcome of this integration is a step-forward to fill the current gap of emerging security 
teaching/research integration for IWMDs.  
 
We have had the following goals in such integration: 
(a) Assess and benchmark the complications in IWMDs security and privacy;   
(b) Evaluate co-design for hardware and software platforms teaching and research 
integration. Indeed, in previous work, co-design architectures through symmetric key 
block ciphers have been evaluated10, motion control robots have been implemented11, and 
co-design education has been researched12); 
(c) IWMDs, and in general, deeply-embedded systems security teaching and research 
challenges and complications benchmark in practice through developing a respective 
multi-disciplinary laboratory; and 
(d) Rochester Institute of Technology-based collaboration as well as inter-university research 
work for advancing education with respect to IWMDs security and privacy. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Related to IWMDs, we present topics needed for 
cryptographic engineering research and teaching integration. Furthermore, the methodology for 
integration is explained through a case study, covering both the challenges for the experimented 
studies and the routes to dissolve them. Finally, we summarize the paper. 
 
Essential (Sub)-Topics for Research/Teaching 
It is known that there exist select resources specifically suitable for embedded systems security 
education13, 14, nevertheless, medical devices (IWMDs) security challenges have not been subject 
of specific readings for educational purposes, to the best of authors’ knowledge. To provide 
select topics and sub-topics (the list includes select items but it does not confine the approach 
and can be broadened) required for cryptographic engineering used for IWMDs security 
research/teaching integration, we would like to first differentiate the materials used in embedded 
security courses15, 16 and the ones specific to IWMDs. Table 1 presents select topics considered 
in the integration process.  
 
Because the main objective of this paper is integration of research and teaching related to 
IWMDs security, we exclude the topics used for education purposes only and are not the results 
of our prior research work. However, it is useful to note that a specific graduate or undergraduate 
level course in IWMDs systems security (and thus a potential textbook) may have a number of 
readings/chapters, i.e., the select topics in Table 1 in addition to, typically, an Introduction and a 
Discussion. Level of readers in such course/reading needs to be taken into account 
(undergraduate- or graduate-level, for instance) and, accordingly, needs to be tailored noting 
different considerations including real-world examples for IWMDs (to encourage the students 
and give them the context within different medical fields), references to the state-of-the-art 
IWMDs security mechanisms and respective solutions (for undergraduate students, specifically, 
to encourage graduate-level studies), platforms for hardware [ASIC/FPGA from different 
vendors such as Xilinx/Altera/Synopsys tools, to name a few] and software (free-of-charge 
platform tools for simulations/syntheses/implementations, for instance), to name a few. 
Table 1. IWMDs security through cryptographic engineering research/teaching 
integration topics 
Select topics Select sub-topics 
 
 
Reliable design 
of IWMDs 
 
• Hardware and software architectures for IWMDs 
• Fault tolerance of IWMDs architectures 
• Design for test and reliability 
• Battery-power preservation 
• Dependability requirements 
 
Cryptographic 
solutions for 
IWMDs 
 
• Cryptographic embedded processors and co-processors 
• Hardware accelerators for secure IWMDs 
• Efficient embedded software implementations 
 
 
Side-channels 
and 
countermeasures  
 
• Side-channel attacks and countermeasures targeting 
IWMDs 
• Fault attacks and countermeasures (considering 
practical attacks for IWMDs hardware 
implementations) 
• Power analysis and cache timing attacks 
 
Case 
studies 
 
• Implantable Cardioverter-Defibrillators 
• Microprocessor-Based Pacemaker Design 
 
 
Risk assessment 
 
• Battery power 
• Overhead tolerance 
• Efficiency measurement 
• Verification and safety 
 
Cryptographic 
tools and 
methodologies 
 
• Metrics for the security of embedded systems 
• Secure programming techniques 
• FPGA design security (embedded hardware) 
 
 
 
Applications 
 
• The Framework of Contextual Integrity 
• Trusted computing platforms deeply-embedded into 
human body 
• Economics of IWMDs security and privacy 
• FDA-relevant policies, solutions, and benchmark 
Fault Analysis Attacks: Integration of Research and Teaching  
Implementation attacks which are based on retrieving secret information from an implemented 
secure cryptographic algorithm are one of the major threats for such devices. In general, such 
attacks could be based on active measures (in which the device is modified, i.e., through active 
attacks, such as fault attacks, or through passive listening to the side-channels, such as power 
analysis attacks. Specifically, in fault analysis attacks, faults are injected and information is 
derived whereas in power analysis attacks, one would only listen to what is leaked, for example 
power traces. To present the results of our IWMDs security teaching and research integration, we 
have used “side-channel analysis attacks” as our topic. As mentioned, these are based on 
information gained from the physical implementation of a cryptosystem (on hardware or 
software), rather than brute force or theoretical weaknesses. As another example, cache timing 
information can provide an extra source of information which can be exploited to break the 
system.  
The reason for selecting fault analysis attacks for providing our methodology is that, as seen in 
Table 1, this topic is related to many other topics, allowing us to cover a large number of sub-
topics used for integration. Table 2 lists this relation (sub-topics are directly related whereas 
related other topics are related indirectly).  
Table 2. Related topics to side-channels. 
Topic Sub-topics Related other topics 
 
 
 
 
Side-channels 
and 
countermeasures  
- Side-channel attacks and 
countermeasures targeting 
IWMDs 
- Fault attacks and 
countermeasures 
(considering practical 
attacks for IWMDs 
hardware implementations) 
- Power analysis and cache 
timing attacks 
- Hardware architectures for IWMDs 
- FPGA design security (embedded 
hardware) 
- Cryptography for IWMDs 
- Reconfigurable hardware for cryptography 
(embedded hardware) 
- Trusted computing platforms deeply-
embedded into human body 
 
Main Step 1. Identifying the Education Challenges: Two of the authors supervise students 
whose research focus is security and reliability (specifically fault diagnosis and tolerance in 
hardware). Fault analysis attacks (active side-channel attacks) topic through fault injection has 
been selected.  
One of the main goals of this phase was to expose the challenges of IWMDs systems security 
education as follows: 
- The first challenge was to find resources directly related to IWMDs security 
education which is an emerging topic. Some important resources are: USENIX 
Enigma conference (a new conference on emerging threats and novel attacks), 
TROOPERS IT Security conference, U.S. House Cybersecurity Caucus, Health 
Privacy & Security Forum, U.S. Senate Hearing on IRS Breach, FDA 
Cybersecurity Workshop, NIST Information Security and Privacy Advisory 
Board on medical device security, Association for the Advancement of Medical 
Instrumentation Standards Week: Medical Device Security working group, 
Healthcare Technology Research and Advisory Council Secure Health, and 
Archimedes Medical Device Security Workshop. 
 
- The second challenge was that the topic chosen is, in nature, multi-disciplinary. 
The expertise of authors in these topics helped filling the gap in cases where 
students were not acquainted with the field of study. The instructors (authors of 
this work) also consulted with faculty members from other departments 
(especially computer science and mathematics) to meet the teaching objectives.     
Main Step 2. Research and Development: Fault analysis is an active sub-variant for side-
channel attacks. In such implementation attacks, faults are injected maliciously (attackers want to 
inject transient faults not to break the system, so their plan is intentionally injecting faults into 
the architectures of crypto-systems to retrieve as much leaked sensitive information as possible). 
With respect to IWMDs, for instance, a pacemaker containing an embedded hard processor, high 
temperature, unsupported supply voltage or current, excessively high overclocking, strong 
electric or magnetic fields, or ionizing radiation, are all the ways to assert faults to influence the 
operation of the processor (here the processor is an ASIC architecture typically; yet, FPGAs 
containing the designs of cryptographic algorithms can very similarly be attacked).  
Let us divide the research and development into two parts. Fig. 1 presents different topics in 
IWMDs security. 
Computer and 
Systems 
Engineering
- Dependability, safety, 
reliability, security, privacy
- Medical device malware
- Risk management
Human Factors
- Clinical engineering
- Usable security
Regulatory Policy
- Pre-market clearance and 
approval processes
- FDA's Good Manufacturing 
Practices 
          
Figure 1. Different topics in IWMDs security. 
 
 
 
Error control coding
- CRC/parity/etc.
- Recomputing using encoded 
operands
Error injection 
simulations
- LFSR-based injections
- Deriving false alarms and 
detection ratios
FPGA/ASIC 
implementations
- Synopsys/ISE/Vivado
- Performance and 
implementation metrics
          
Figure 2. Sub-parts of the presented research scheme for integrating with teaching in this work. 
Many error detection schemes have been proposed to defend against fault analysis attacks. We 
have followed the teaching tasks as seen in the flowchart of Fig. 2, including three sub-parts: (a) 
error control coding, (b) error injection simulations for error coverage derivation for 
single/multiple stuck-at zero/one, and (c) FPGA/ASIC implementations to derive the overheads.  
Finally, we have given three sub-cases to the students: (a) low-complexity block ciphers which 
are more lightweight than the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), (b) public-key 
cryptography with the case elliptic-curve cryptography (ECC), and (c) non-cryptography 
computer arithmetic architectures (e.g., CORDIC and Viterbi algorithms) whose reliability 
assurance is critical.  
Main Step 3. Integration of Research and Teaching: For this step, we have built on the 
research of a group of graduate students in the second phase during the academic years of 2013-
2014 and 2014-2015.   
Engaging students in non-traditional learning activities: For understanding the IWMDs 
security, this step is pivotal. There are a number of sub-steps needed for this main step: 
- Asking students to read research papers (venues include both security and medical 
domains) to explain the core of research on IWMDs security,  
- Contacting the authors of research papers, when needed, and  
- Conducting discussion sessions to share the learning materials and hard/soft skills 
Comparison of traditional embedded security and IWMDs security: The second sub-step was to 
contrast traditional embedded security and IWMDs security based on the differences between 
these two. Fig. 3 shows the major differences taught to the students (IWMDs vs. traditional 
embedded systems security). This is a step-forward towards integration of emerging 
cryptographic engineering teaching and research.  
Why IWMDs security is different?
-  Both privacy-wise and security-wise are very 
sensitive compared to traditional systems. Here we 
talk about life-threatening adverse effects.
- Security solutions for traditional embedded systems 
may not be applicable or may not suffice.
- IWMDs and respective medical systems may have 
transient usage patterns, where access
privileges need to be defined over time and space, not
just by the user.
- For IWMDs, it might be impractical for users to
explicitly perform system administration tasks such as 
security patching, etc.
- Cryptographic solutions add much overhead and are 
thus impractical.
- Danger of battery-depletion is far more than 
traditional systems.
Security differences Implementation differences
   
Figure 3. Traditional vs. IWMDs security (comparison for teaching and research integration). 
Identifying the modularity of different cryptographic algorithms: These include algorithms 
such as SHA3 and the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES). The sub-step includes applying 
fault diagnosis and tolerance techniques specified for IWMDs.  
Fig. 4 shows the first part of an S-box structure for the Pomaranch cipher. The structure of 
Pomaranch is based on linear feedback shift registers (LFSRs) which allow fast implementation 
and produce sequences with large period if the feedback polynomial is chosen appropriately 
(often clock controlled for complexity induction and used in conjunction with “jumping” to 
increase the efficiency and reach a CJCSG structure). The operations used in composite fields 
include addition, multiplication (including multiplication with constant), squaring, cubing, and 
inversion in GF(23). The architecture of the substitution box in Fig. 4 includes a first sub-part 
which contains the transformation matrix M whose input is shown by X in GF(29) to get an 
output of A in GF((23)3).  
Composite fields can be utilized to realize the substitution box to achieve low-complexity 
architectures. In Pomaranch, the two most and least significant bits are discarded to get to the 
uneven structure of the substitution box of Pomaranch. 
 
Figure 4. Hierarchy of the first part of an S-box structure for the Pomaranch cipher. 
Educational Objectives: 
- Understanding the implementation platforms (hardware [ASIC/FPGA] or 
software [microcontrollers]) through which the overheads were derived, this 
objective is fulfilled by implementing the original and fault detection designs and 
deriving the metrics overheads.  
- Refining soft skills including presentation of the results of IWMDs security 
research (a) orally or (b) in writing, and decision-making. 
- Evaluating hard technical skills for simulations and implementations of the fault 
diagnosis schemes for crypto-systems. 
We already have a security laboratory and the security assessment is based on the resources in 
the already-developed “Applied Cryptography” laboratory. The form of outcome of the 
assessment will be mostly in programming languages specially hardware description languages 
of cryptographic algorithms developed as final projects. It is worth mentioning that the authors 
of this work have extensive background on fault detection and tolerance in many fields including 
cryptography17-34. Moreover, in the fields of computer arithmetic and cryptographic engineering, 
they have prior expertise35-45. 
Integration Problems for Teaching and Research of IWMDs 
The problems, challenges, and complications during the course of the integration have been 
resolved. In what follows, through three instances, we present some of them. 
IWMDs and fault detection and tolerance with respect to cryptography have broad theory. This 
includes time/hardware/hybrid redundancies. Books and readings as well as conference/journal 
papers have been used for instruction of students. Nevertheless, we note that just trying random 
faults will not be helpful in breaking most ciphers. As such, error detection approaches based on 
recomputing with encoded operands for both transient and permanent faults can be used, for 
instance, as a remedy. The attackers might use entropy-aware injections to bypass the solutions. 
Through the research work done in 2013-2015, we refined the approaches to have specific 
applicability to fault attacks. 
Simulation-based assessments through single/multiple stuck-at zero/one, transient and permanent 
faults are a major part of fault diagnosis and tolerance in cryptography. Single stuck-at fault 
injection is usually done for assessing the effectiveness of the proposed fault diagnose methods. 
Nevertheless, the injection locations depend on the specific problem to solve, e.g., Pomaranch, 
Sha-3, or ECC architectures.  
A challenge here is that the integration of research and teaching becomes very application-
specific and dynamic with respect to error simulations. There are two methods, in general, for 
assessing the fault coverage of the designs. The choice of hardware or software based injections 
through C++ or LFSRs is an important step to take. These application specific choices make the 
integration of “simulation” step as a number of general guidelines rather than specific schemes.   
The complications in the implementation step usually relate to the ASIC and FPGA tools and 
hardware. Specifically, for IWMDs, if ASIC is used as the hardware platform, Synopsys tools 
are used for implementations to derive the metrics (Design Compiler, PrimeTime PX, and the 
like). For FPGAs, Xilinx Vivado and Altera Quartus II are utilized.   
 
Discussions and Conclusions 
We have observed increased student engagement and deeper understanding through inquiry-led 
learning of fundamentals of IWMDs security. Moreover, it certainly helped generating additional 
research output/knowledge creation and strengthened pathways to postgraduate research (we are 
currently working on a number of IEEE Transactions journal papers and related conference 
papers as a result of such creation). 
We also believe that linkage of research and teaching in academic work is beneficial for the 
departments the authors are affiliated with. Students become knowledge workers and are engaged 
in concept of the provisionality of existing knowledge. Overall, the students were satisfied with 
the integration outcome and also their publications progress.  
Data management has been a pivotal part of this integration, noting that the results are useful for 
advancing global education and with the aim of possible improvement from both research and 
education communities. 
In this paper, for IWMDs security research and teaching integration, new methods considering 
their complications are presented. We have presented the results of two years of implementing 
the presented strategy at graduate-level through fault attacks of Pomaranch case study. The 
results of the presented work show the success of the presented work while pinpointing the 
challenges encountered compared to traditional embedded system security research/teaching 
integration. We were successful in exposing the challenges of IWMDs security education 
through working closely with a number of students in the areas of cryptographic engineering and 
general reliability. Finally, inter- and intra-university research collaborations were initiated. 
These help us towards future directions of such integration, e.g., post-quantum cryptography.  
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